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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Harry E. Fitzwater  
Director of Personnel Policy, Planning,  
and Management

SUBJECT: Response on Senior Intelligence Service Statistics

REFERENCE: Your Memo dtd 12 May 1980; Subject: Senior  
Intelligence Service Statistics

1. It is possible to work our promotion rates so that an orderly increase in the number of SIS 1-4 is achieved during FY's-1980 - 83, but the interesting consequence is that the promotion rates must vary from year to year to achieve this. In the memorandum of 2 May, there was an attempt to maintain relatively steady promotion numbers in the face of a projected high attrition for FY-1981 and lower attrition projected for FY's-1982 and 1983. As a result, losses during FY-1981 were projected to exceed new SIS entrants, and the result was the dip in FY-1981 to which you referred. Table 1 illustrates the variable promotion rates that would be needed to avoid this dip. Table 2 shows resultant SIS levels.

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2. With reference to stretching the return to the  level over five years rather than three and one-half, this could be done and we have developed the promotion levels necessary to do this. The reason this was not done in the earlier paper of 2 May was a pessimistic expectation that by 1984 we would again see a resurgence of inflation and that this would be accompanied once more by a higher attrition rate. Though we would hate to be pinned down to a forecast of this sequence, it is a fact that we seem to be having a six- to seven-year cycle between inflationary peaks and that FY-1984 would be a logical candidate for another upswing in inflation. On this line of reasoning, FY's-1984 - 86 would not be likely years to see a reduction of promotion rates in the Senior Intelligence Service. If you do not share this pessimism, Table 3 illustrates the promotion rates associated with a five-year return to the  level. Table 4 shows resultant SIS levels.

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3. You asked us to take a look at the situation for GS-13's through GS-15's. There are two factors to consider here. The first is the adequacy of the feeder group in numbers. The second is the possibility of increasing promotions into and within the feeder group.

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4. The Analysis Staff finds that the feeder group is not affected by the same variability in attrition rates as the Senior Intelligence Service and that the levels and promotion rates have held relatively consistent over recent years. According to APP statistics, the following are the Agency totals for selected years:

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According to the promotion planning projections prepared last summer for FY-1980 through FY-1984, no significant changes in levels are anticipated.

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5. With respect to promotion rates in the GS-13 through GS-15 group, unoccupied headroom at the Senior Intelligence Service levels does make some grade points available for the feeder group level that could be used to increase the number of promotions there. The effect would be slight, however, because the numbers are so large, and the impact on motivation would be less than the impact of a higher rate of promotion to SIS. For example, with  GS-14's, holding back on  SIS promotions would only increase the possible promotion rate from GS-14 to GS-15 by 2 percent of the total GS-14 population.

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6. In its survey of the literature, the Analysis Staff has found that the concern elsewhere in Government is focused more intensely on the problems that arise when officers are given management or supervisory responsibility at the senior executive level and are not given commensurate pay or prerequisites. Because of pay compression, high responsibility is assumed by employees who receive very little or no increase in pay. However, enhancement of status and some relatively low-cost benefits, such as leave retention and the possibility of awards, materially improve the attractiveness of the positions. To withhold these would have little budgetary impact but would adversely affect the attractiveness of higher responsibility. There would be little incentive to lengthen the period of active service at higher responsibility. It is important to provide promotion and the accompanying benefits to officers qualified to perform the corresponding duties.

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7. The DCI reserve of  former SPS allowances results from Agency allowance not utilized by the Directorates. Accordingly, these allowances, which are now included within the SIS allowance, have been incorporated into the DCI reserve.

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8. The differences between Table 2 and 3 (2 May paper) with respect to the number on board on 31 March have to do with the inclusion of SIS-5 through SIS-6 in Table 3 and exclusion of these grades in Table 2.

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